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Means: Property

PROPERTY
DAvID H. MEANS*

Extinguishment of Restrictive, Covenants on Land
Dunlap v. Beaty' was an action seeking a declaratory judgment that a restrictive covenant on land was no longer in
effect and should be nullified. In 1935 defendant, who had
extensive holdings of land in and near the -City of Rock
Hill, sold and conveyed to plaintiff -a 3.67 acre lot in the city,
subject to the following covenant, among others: "It is, also
covenanted and agreed that no building on said premises shall
ever be used as a store or for the conduct of 'mercantile
business .. "
The lot was part of a tract of 133 acres which, at the time
of the sale to plaintiff, defendant was using primarily as
a farm. Later defendant developed a part of the tract as
a residential subdivision. Another portion of 6 acres lying
to the east of plaintiff's lot and separated therefrom by
a 42 foot street defendant conveyed for use as a shopping
center to a corporation she controlled.
Plaintiff thereafter sued to extinguish the covenant upon
the grounds: (1) that it was not imposed as part of a general
scheme of improvement, and (2) that since execution of
the deed there had been such a radical change in the character
of the neighborhood as to destroy the essential object and
purpose of the restriction. Individuals owning lots in several
nearby subdivisions developed by defendant were made parties defendant as class representatives of other lot owners
in these subdivisions.
As summarized by the Court, the referee to whom the
case was referred:
. . . concluded that the covenant in controversy was
not imposed as a part of a general scheme of improvement; that it was a covenant personal to the grantor;
and that because of the radical change in the character
of the neighborhood, to which Mrs. Beaty had contributed,
the essential object and purpose of the restriction had
been defeated and that it should now be extinguished.
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 239 S. C. 196, 122 S. E. 2d 9 ,(1961).
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The circuit judge confirmed the referee's report and on
appeal the circuit decree was affirmed. After a detailed
Xeview of the evidence the Court concluded that the concurrent fact findings of referee and circuit judge should
not be disturbed. Even after the facts were settled, however, several questions of law remained.
One of these was the extent of the area to be considered
in determining whether there had been a radical change in
the character of the neighborhood. In answer the Court

.stated:
We do not agree with [defendants] that in determining
whether there has been a radical change in conditions,
the Court-is restricted to the area within the tract conveyed to plaintiff and cannot consider the area surround-2
ing her property. We do not think Mcrtin v. Cantre/l,
...
cited by [defendant] requires such a'strict limitation.
The principles there laid down do not apply to a single
lot or parcel of land but to the general development and
division of a larger tract of land.
The Court recQgnized that the lack of a general scheme of
development alone would not prevent the defendant's enforce:ment of the covenant:
She had a right to impose restrictions on a portion of
her property without creating any obligation to restrict
ithe remainder .... The fact that she did not develop
the immedate area around plaintiff's property in accordance with a general scheme does not affect any right
she may have to enforce the restrictions against plaintiff. This is true even if, as found by the Referee, the
covenant was personal to her.
The most troublesome question, theretofore undecided in
South- Carolina, 3 was whether changed conditions could be
invoked as a ground for affirmative relief against a restrictive covehant prior, to a breach thereof, as well as by answer
25. 225 S. C. 140, 81 S. E. 2d 37 (1954), in which the Court cited an-

thorities to the effect that a change of conditions without the area of a

restricted subdivision does not affect the validity of the restrictions.
3. An action for affirmative relief against restrictive covenants had
been brought in Martin v. Cantrell, 225 S. C. 140, 81 S. E. 2d 37 (1954),
but as stated by the Court in Dunlap, note 1, supra, "... . the right to do
so was not -questioned 'by the defendants." Moreover, in that case the
Court concluded that there had been no change of conditions which would
warrant the relief sought.
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to a suit seeking its equitable enforcement after breach. After
reviewing the authorities, the Court concluded:
[T]he great weight of modern authority is that in an
action under the declaratory judgment statute or one to
remove cloud on title, affirmative relief may be granted
against a restrictive covenant where there is such a
change in the character of the neighborhood as to render
the enforcement of the covenant valueless to the covenantee and oppressive and unreasonable as to the covenantor. In other words, the later cases hold that a
change of conditions can serve not only as a shield,
but also as a sword.
Considering whether the defendant covenantee would be
entitled to damages should the covenant be extinguished by
decree, the Court recognized that "[i]n some jurisdictions
permitting affirmative relief from a restriction, it is held
that such relief should only be granted upon the condition that
the covenantee is paid any damages sustained by him." In
view of the existent circumstances, however, the Court found
the defendant was not entitled to damages.
Defendant argued that if plaintiff were allowed to use her
land for commercial purposes in violation of the covenant,
the commercial value of defendant's shopping center would
be materially injured. In reply the Court observed that:
...
the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that
the purpose of this restriction was to preserve this area
as a residential section. It was not designed to protect
Mrs. Beaty against commercial competition. This being
so, it cannot now be used to enable her to obtain a
monopoly with respect to the business enterprises that
might be introduced into the area.
Nuisance - Accumulation of Surface Water
In Bowlin v. George,4 a residence owner sued to recover
damages resulting from the maintenance of an adjacent automobile junk yard and to enjoin the continuance thereof.
The complaint alleged that stagnant water accumulated in
the wrecked automobile parts, and that mosquitoes bred therein and were harbored in the weeds growing on the premises.
A demurrer to the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action was overruled, which disposition was affirmed on
4. 239 S. C. 429, 123 S. E. 2d 528 (1962).
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appeal. Despite defendant's contention that the accumulation
of surface water cannot constitute a nuisance per accidens,
the complaint was found to state a cause of action for such
a nuisance.
In Baltzeger v. Carolina-MidlandRailway Co.,5 it was said:
The only exception to the rule that surface water being
a common enemy, every landowner has the right to deal
with it in such manner as he sees fit, is that it is subject
to the general law in regard to nuisances, if its accumulation has become a nuisance per se, as for example,
whenever it has become dangerous at all times and under
all circumstances to life, health or property.
Certainly this dictum, repeated in several later cases, 6 would
seem to support defendant's position. In fact, however, the
Court, without expressly overruling the stated proposition,
at least on one occasion has parried its thrust.7 In the instant. case the proposition was found inapplicable because
" .. this case does not involve the obstruction of the flow
of surface water or the right of an owner to deal with it,
and we fail to see how the law relating to the handling of
surface water has any application."
Since plaintiff's alleged cause of action was bottomed at
least in part upon defendant's accumulation (albeit unintended rather than through design) of surface water, it is
difficult to understand why the law relative to the handling
of such water was not applicable.8 A more suitable ration5. 54 S. C. 242, 247, 32 S. E. 358, 71 Am. St. Rep. 789 (1899).
6. Among other cases to this effect, see Touchberry v. Northwestern
R.R. Co., 87 S. C. 415, 423, 424, 69 S. E. 877 (1911); Rivenbark v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 124 S. C. 136, 141, 117 S. E. 206 (1922); Deason v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. 142 S. C. 328, 333, 140 S. E. 575 (1927) ; Garmany
v. Southern Ry., 152 S. C. 205, 220, 149 S. E. 765 (1929) (dissenting
opinion); Fairey v. Southern Ry., 162 S. C. 129, 132-133, 160 S. E. 274
(1931). In Fairey, Justice Cothran stated (162 S. C. at p. 132) "... [T]his
Court [has] held that a person dealing with surface water on his own land
is not required to exercise even reasonable care with regard to the rights
of other landowners . . .

."

See also, discussion of Baltzeger in Crosby v.

Southern Ry., 221 S. C. 135, 138, 69 S.E. 2d 209 (1952).
Of course the South Carolina cases recognize that it is an actionable
wrong for one to cast surface water on another's land in concentrated
form. See Rivenbark v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., supra; Garmany v.
Southern Ry., supra. In this instant case such basis of liability was not
present, however.
7. Deason v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., supra note 3. See discussion of
this case in Kinyo & McClure, Interference With Surface Waters, 24 Minn.
Law Review 891, 933 note 200 (1940.) See also Judge Parker's comment,
quoted in note 12, infra.
8. Of course it may be that the Court considered the growth of weeds
to constitute a nuisance, quite aside from the accumulation of surface
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alization of this very proper decision 9 might have been a frank
repudiation of the Baltzeger dictum and recognition of the
fact that in his disposition of surface water a landowner
should enjoy no exemption from the rules applied under the
rubric, "nuisance per accidens," to other kinds of unreason10
able conduct in the use of land.
In an appraisal of the South Carolina law of surface water
two leading scholars stated:
In South Carolina it is said that the common enemy rule
is in force, subject to the qualification that a possessor
of land is not privileged by altering the flow of surface
water, to create a "nuisance-' or a "nuisance per se." The
general acceptance of this proposition seems to have been
brought about through the reiteration of a dictum from a
relatively early case. Whatever its source, however, the
proposition is relatively meaningless, and its principle
effect has been to throw the South Carolina law of surface waters into confusion. 1
Whether Bowlin has wholly dispelled this confusion is
doubtful.
the general rule that
A further matter discussed was ...
an individual can neither abate, nor recover damages for, a
public nuisance, unless he can show that he has sustained therefrom damage of a special character, distinct and different
from the injuries suffered by the public generally." It was
defendant's contention that even if his accumulation of rain
water be considered a nuisance per se public in character, the
complaint failed to state a cause of action since it alleged no
special damage sustained by plaintiff. However, the Court
:found ample precedent to support its conclusion that quite
water. If this be true, however, the quoted statement is less than adequate
explanation. As to whether non encroaching vegetation is a private nuisance see Annot. 83 A.L.R. 2d 936 (1962). See also Annot. 84 A.L.R. 2d
653 ?1962), which collects the cases dealing with the question whether
an automobile wrecking yard constitutes a nuisance.
9. To the effect that conditions which breed or tend to breed mosquitoes
constitute a nuisance, see Annot. 61 A.L.R. 1145 (1929).
10. See PROSSER, TORTS 415, 416 (2d ed. 1955); Kinyon & McClure,
Interference With Surface Waters, 24 MINN. LAW RFNiEw 891, 933 note
200.
11. Kinyon & McClure, Interference With Surface Waters, 24 MINN.

analyze cerLAW REVIEw 891, 933 (1940). The authors' footnotes, whichreferred
to is

tain of the South Carolina cases, are omitted. The dictum
the quoted passage from Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland Ry. Co., note 5

supra.
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aside from any injury to the public, as to plaintiff it was
12
a private nuisance for which he had a private remedy.
Defendant's further argument that the alleged damages
were not direct but consequential, the Court found to be
without merit, as "[t]he damages complained of flow directly
from the alleged improper maintenance and operation of this
junk yard."
Obstruction of a Watercourse
Johnson v. Williams,13 was a suit between adjoining landowners in which plaintiff recovered nominal damages for the
flooding of her land, caused by defendant's construction of
a dam which obstructed a ditch through which water from
plaintiff's land drained across that of defendant. A mandatory injunction ordering removal of the dam also was
granted.
On appeal the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
"The basic issue," said the Court:
Was whether or not the drainway across the lands of
respondent and appellant was a natural watercourse ....
The obstruction of the flow of surface water is generally
not actionable, while the obstruction of the flow of a
natural watercourse, if it results in damage to an adjoining landowner, is actionable.... [T]here is ample
evidende upon which to base the findings of the jury that
[defendant] obstructed a natural watercourse.
The opinion discusses in detail the distinction between
surface water and the water of a natural watercourse as,
well as the law applicable to obstructions of such waters.
Plaintiff's action was maintainable without proof of actual
monetary loss, since damage would be presumed from the
wrongful flooding of her land. Moreover, the possibility that
defendant's creation of a permanent drainage obstruction
under claim of right might ripen into a prescriptive interest was sufficient injury to sustain plaintiff's action.
12. Among other cases, the Court referred to Sullivan v. American Mfg.

Co., b3 F. 2d 690 (4th Cir. 1929) wherein Judge Parker concluded (at p.

694) : "So far as the Baltzegar Case [note 5 supra] may be said to hold
that the ponding of water which creates a public nuisance is not actionable

at the instance of an individual whose property is damaged thereby, it is
inconsistent with the later case of Deason v. Sou. Ry. Co. [note 6, supra]
and to the extent of the inconsistency must be held to be overruled by

13. 238 S. C. 623, 121 S. E.2d 223 (1961).
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Defendant contended that in view of his substantial investment to develop the drainage upon his farm,'a mandatory
injunction should not issue, relying upon the following pas14
sage from Forest Land Co. v. Black:
In cases where a mandatory injunction is sought, the
general rule in this country ... is that the court will
balance the benefit of an injunction to the plaintiff
against the inconvenience and damage to the defendant,
and grant an injunction or award damages as seem most
consistent with justice and equity under the circumstances of the case.
In reply the Court stated:
With the foregoing doctrine we agree in general, but
as stated in 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, Section 55: "Certainly, the doctrine does not mean that substantial, certain, and irreparable damages to the complaining party,
which might be prevented by injunction, are to be left
without remedy because of the fact that greater damages
would result to the defendant, a wrongdoer, by issuing
the injunction."1 5

The granting of injunctive relief rests in the discretion
of the trial court, and we think that it was properly exercised in this case.
14. 216 s. C.255, 266, 57 S. E. 2d 420 (1950).

15. If the flooding of plantiff's land be considered a private nuisance

[see PRossER, TORTS 406 (2d ed 1955), 55 AMa. Jun., Waters § 18], earlier

South Carolina cases would indicate that a court has no discretion to
withhold injunctive relief. Thus in Williams v. Haile Goldmining Co., 85
S. C. 1, 6, 66 S. E. 117, reh. den. 85 S. C. 1, 66 S. E. 1057 (1910), the
Court said: "Whatever may be the doctrine in other States, under the
provisions of the Constitution of this State, that private property shall
not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, the Court
could not have considered, in deciding whether to grant or refuse the injunction, the question raised by the defendant as to the balance of convenience, or of advantage or disadvantage to the plaintiff and defendant and

the public at large, for the defendant's use of the stream. That question
would be pertinent only in an application addressed to the Legislature to
give such corporations the power of condemnation." See also Davis v.
Palmetto Quarries Co., 212 S. C. 496, 500, 48 S. E. 2d 329 (1948). The
wisdom of the rule declared in these cases is doubtful. See Nicholson,
The Trend - To balance the Injuries, 4 S.C.L.Q. 540 (1952); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 941 (1939). The instant case, it would seem, is properly
explainable as one not calling for a balancing of the injuries, rather than
one denying the existence- of such power. The Court's final statement that
"t]the granting of injunctive relief rests in the discretion of the Trial
Court .. ." would indicate that at this date it entertains no doubt of its
injuries.
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;Rule againstPerpetuities

A will contest, Black v. Gettys,16 posed interesting questions, not only in the law of property, but also in the field
of trusts and of specific performance of contracts. Only the
property questions are considered in this section of the survey.
The testator was survived by his wife, 4 children (only
one of whom was of age), and 2 grandchildren. As amended
by codicil, item 6 of his will provided:
I give, bequeath and devise to my Trustee... to have
and to hold the same upon the trusts following, namely:
To pay the income thereof, after expenses and taxes,
to my wife, for a period of ten (10) years after my
death, or for so long during ten (10) years after my
death as she shall remain unmarried, in quarterly, semiannual or annual installments, as may ,e convenient to
my Trustee, and, thereafter, for a plriod of twenty
'(20) years, to pay the income thereof, after expenses
and taxes, in convenient quarterly, semi-annual or annual
payments, as follows: One-half (1/) to my wife, Ola,
for so long during said period as she shall remain unmarried, and one-half (1/2), or such part of said income
not paid to my wife, to my children, Nancy Jean Lovick,
Anna, John and Betty (per stirpes), share and share
alike; and then at the expiration of thirty-six (36) years
after my death, my Trustee shall deliver my trust estate
.to my aforesaid children, (per stirpes), in such form
as it may then exist, or in kind or money, share and share
alike, (per stirpes), in full ownership, and the trust
thereon shall thereupon terminate.
Subsequent to probate of the will in common form,.1 7 the
widow and adult child sued to obtain, among other things,18
a declaration that item 6 as amended was violative of the
rule against perpetuities, and that the property named there16. 238 S. C. 167, 119 S. E. 2d 660 (1961).
17. Record, p. 1.
18. Plaintiff also sought an adjudication that item 5 was violative of

the rule against perpertuities as well as the removal of the executor and

trustee on the ground of extreme hostility and prejudice against the
widow. In turn the executor and trustee filed a cross petition in which

he asked that the widow be required to perform the terms of a stock

option contract entered into between her and her husband. Plaintiffs did

not appeal adverse rulings on the two matters first mentioned, but did
successfully appeal from the circuit decree ordering performance of the
stock option contract.
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in must pass under the residuary clause to the widow free
of trust.
Plaintiff's argument that item 6 was violative of the rule
was bottomed upon the contention that the persons to take
at the termination of the trust were determinable not within
lives in being, but only at the expiration of a 36-year period
in gross. 10 This was true, it was alleged, because the gift in
remainder "to my aforesaid children, (per stirpes)" was a
gift to a class whose membership was not determinable until
the time for distribution, since the testator's use of per stirpes
evidenced his intention that only the children then surviving
and the issue of deceased children should share in the gift.
The scheme of the will, it was said, showed the testator's
intention to benefit his descendants rather than the heirs,
next of kin, or legatees of his children. Furthermore, the
"divide and pay over" rule was applicable, in that the testator's intention to postpone vesting of the interest in remainder
was manifested by his direction that "at the expiration of
36 years after my death, my Trustee shall deliver my trust
estate to my aforesaid children, (per stirpes)...."
The Supreme Court agreed with both the special master
and the circuit judge that the provisions of item 6 were not
violative of the rule against perpetuities. The familiar preference in doubtful cases, for a vested rather than contingent
construction, was invoked. The gift "to the aforesaid children"
was a gift to named individuals rather than one to a class,
since just prior thereto in the same item there had been a
gift to the children as named individuals.2 0
Nor did the Court give to per stirpes the technical meaning assigned it by plaintiffs.
*. . When this phrase is considered in connection with
its use in other portions of the will, we do not think it
implies a requirement of survival; rather, it was used in
19. After noting 11... the question of whether public policy requires that
an indestructible private trust be limited in duration even though all interests are vested," the Court declared ... this interesting question need
not now be decided and we intimate no opinion thereabout. No attack is
made on the duration of the trust as violative of public policy. Here appellants have invoked only the common law rule against perpetuities."
20. Cf. Note 61 A.L.R. 2d 212, 245 (1958): "The conclusion that a gift
to the 'children' of the testator so designated and not named in the language of gift, was made to them merely as individuals, may rest wholly
or in part upon the circumstance that the testator had already named his
children, since in such a case the later words, 'my children,' may have been

used merely to avoid an unnecessary repetition of names."
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elaboration of the phrase "share and share alike" to
indicate that the corpus of the trust was to be divided
among the named children in equal shares ....
It is argued that this will was drawn by an attorney
who must have known the technical meaning of the
words "per stirpes" and used them to imply that to take,
a child must survive the termination of the trust. But
it may just as plausibly be said that if this was the
meaning intended, he would have used express words of
survivorship or inserted a substitutionary clause.
We conclude that the words "per stirpes" were not used
in this Item to imply survivorship, nor does the phrase
designate alternative takers ....21
The Court found a number of ". . circumstances [to]
fully rebut any inference under the divide and pay over
rule that the beneficiaries must survive the termination of
the trust." 1. The gift in issue was to named individuals
and not to a class. Earlier South Carolina cases cited as
stating the rule involved class gifts, and many courts limit
application of the rule to such gifts. In the few jurisdictions
which apply it to gifts to individuals, "... the force of the
rule is given much less effect." 2. The gift here involved
Was found to come within two exceptions to the rule:
(1) The purpose of postponing the division of the corpus
of the trust was primarily to provide an income to the
widow and not to let in additional members of a class.
(2) The children after the expiration of ten years share
in the distribution of the income and for their benefit
the trustee is authorized under certain circumstances to
invade the corpus.
3. "[T]he direction to. the trustee," said the Court, "is not
technically to divide and pay over, but simply to 'deliver'
the corpus to the remainderman." 4. The rule ". . . is only a
rule of contruction. It does not itself create the requirement
of survival, but at times is of value in the determination of
whether such requirement was intended by the language of
the gift."
21. Plaintiffs had cited 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 285, comment k
(1944) in support of the view that the limitation's inclusion of per stirpes
broadened the meaning of "aforesaid children" to include grandchildren,
but the court found the comment to be applicable only to class gifts,
whereas the gift in issue was construed as one to named individuals.
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Having concluded 'that no part of the provisions of item
6 were violative of the rule against perpetutities, the Court
found it unnecessary ".,. . to determine whether if the rule
were violated, the trust created should be allowed to stand
for the period fixed by the rule."
A further contention that the trust created by item 6 was
void because of indefiniteness of beneficiary in the event
of certain contingencies, was found to be without merit.
Time of Vesting -

Extent of Beneficiary's Interest

In Leathers v. Leathers,2 2 a suit to construe a testamentary
trust, the testator directed that his assets be held in trust
for the support of his widow for life, and at her death
that the trust should continue until Hudson, one of his two
sons, should reach the age of 30 years:
...at which time I direct my said Trustee to divide my
said trust estate into two equal parts, one part to be
forthwith transferred to my son, Hudson, freed and discharged of all trusts; the other one-half of my trust
estate to be continued as a trust fund for the sole benefit
and use of my son, John, the entire income, after the
payment of expenses of said trust, to be paid to my
said son, John, at least twice a year. Should John's
business ability ripen and mature to such an extent
as... should warrant the turning over to him of ...
the trust fund herein created for his benefit . . ..my
said Trustee is hereby authorized, empowered and directed to pay over to my said son, John, . . . the trust
fund.., freed and discharged of al trusts.
Should either of my sons die before the time for the
distribution of my estate as hereinabove fixed, leaving
a child or children surviving him, then, and in that event,
such child or children shall receive the part of my estate
to which their father would have been entitled. Should
either of my sons die without leaving a child or children
surviving him but leaving a widow, then, and in that
event, his share shall go one-half to his widow and onehalf to his surviving brother under the terms of the
trust hereinabove created, and in the event either of
my sons should die without leaving either a widow or
22. 289 S. C. 94, 121 S. E. 2d 354 (1951).
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child or children surviving him, then his share shall
go to his surviving brother under the terms of the trust
hereinabove created.
At the time of suit the widow was dead and one-half the
assets had been distributed to Hudson, who had attained the
age of 30. It was conceded that John's business ability had
not ripened and matured to such an extent as would require
the trustee to turn over to him any part of the trust corpus.
The question presented was whether Hudson had any interest in the undistributed part of the trust fund, he contending that he had a contingent interest which would entitle
him to share in any undistributed corpus should John predecease him leaving no children.
The Court agreed with the circuit judge that the entire
beneficial interest in the undistributed corpus was indefeasibly
vested in John. The provision for a gift over in the event
either son should "die before the time for distribution of
my estate as hereinabove fixed," had reference to the time
fixed for distribution of the estate between the two' sons
when Hudson attained the age of 30, and not to the time
when John's share of the corpus was to be paid him. This,
the Court said, was "[t]he only reasonable construction,"
and since both sons had' survived Hudson's attainment of
30, the provision therefore was inapplicable.
Nor did the fact that John's interest was to be held in
trust after distribution of Hudson's share indicate that John's
interest was limited to and for his lifetime. In such a case
the inference is that the testator intended to treat all the
objects of his bounty alike,23 absent a gift over to indicate
that a different treatment was intended. 24 Furthermore,
'[a] gift of the income of a fund without a limitation as to
time is a gift in perpetuity and carries the fund itself .... ,,25
It was contended for Hudson that the
could not be more than an equitable life
testator ".... intended to and did create a
23. Quoting 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 128.2 p. 669 (1939)
24. Quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS

interest of John
estate since the
spendthrift trust
to this effect.

§ 128 Comment (c) (1959)

to this effect.

25. The quoted language is part of a lengthy passage from Millard's
Appeal, 87 Pa 457 (1878). To the same effect is McFadden v. Hefley, 28

S. C. 317, 324, 5 S. E. 812, 13 Am. St. Rep. 675 (1888).
cases, see Note, 174 A.L.R. 319 (1948).
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to protect his son ....
,"26 Finding it unnecessary to reach
this question, the Court stated, "We intimate no opinion as
to whether a creditor of John could reach the corpus, nor
whether it could be transferred or encumbered by him."
PartitionSale Set Aside for Failure to Appoint Guardian
Ad Litem for Mentally Incompetent Parties
Lister v. Gossett27 was an action to set aside a partition
sale on the ground that two mentally incompetent persons
owning an interest in the land had not been represented by
a guardian ad litem. Affirming the circuit decree, the Court
held that the sale was properly set aside when the plaintiffs
in the original action, although aware of the mental condition of the incompetents, failed to apply for the2 appointment
of a guardian ad litem, as required by statute.
Setting Aside Deed Obtained by Fraud
In Watson v. Wall,20 wherein the executrix of a deceased
grantor sought to set aside a deed on the grounds that it
had been procured by fraud, the Court agreed with the circuit judge (who had reversed a special referee) that the
evidence established that the grantor, although of subnormal
mentality, fully understood the transaction whereby he sold
his interest to his brother, a capable businessman, and did
not show that the brother defrauded the grantor or took undue
advantage of him. The case is further discussed in the Survey
of Evidence.
Cases Omitted
A number of cases which are discussed in detail in other
sections of the annual survey have been omitted from the
property section. One s° which is discussed in the Wills and
26. Appellant's Brief p. 6, which cited Spann v. Carson, 123 S. C. 368,
116 S. E. 7 (1923); Lynch v. Lynch, 161 S. C. 170, 159 S. E. 26 (1931) ;
and Albergotti v. Summers 203 S. C. 137, 26 S. E. 2d 395 (1943) for the
proposition that the interest of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust cannot
exceed an equitable life estate. Statements to this effect in the above cases
are obiter dicta, and the modern weight of authority is contra. See Scorr,
TRUSTS § 153 p. 1075 (2d ed. 1956). Restatement (Second), Trusts § 15&
(1954) (modifying the first RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS).
27. 239 S. C. 22, 121 S. E. 2d 235 (1961).
28. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-236, as amended 47
Stat. 2042 (1952).
29. 239 S. C. 109, 121 S. E. 2d 427 (1961).
30. Furman University v. McLeod, 238 S. C. 475, 120 S. E. 2d 865

(1961).
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Trusts section, is the latest of several suits8l involving the
title to the old campus of Furman University, acquired under
deeds made by Vardy McBee more than a century ago. Brunson v. Sports,3 2 a suit by the beneficiaries of an estate against
a grantee from the administratrix, who herself had taken title
to land in satisfaction of a debt due the estate, raised questions of adverse possession and of bona fide purchase of the
legal title. This case also is included in Wills and Trusts.
Walter J. Klein Co. v. Kneece,3 3 a suit by a judgment creditor to set aside an allegedly fraudulent conveyance of realty
by the judgment debtor, is discussed under Miscellaneous,
and under Pleading.
Discussion of three cases 84 involving the Motor Vehicle
Title Law 5 will be found in Security Transactions.
LEGISLATION

Amendment of the Bailment Statute
Discussion of the 1962 Amendment to the Bailment Statute"
will be found in Security Transactions.
Horizontal Property Act
Act No. 7503 provides for South Carolina Horizontal Property (Condominium) legislation comparable to that enacted
in Puerto Rico 88 and a number of states.39 Generally speaking, the purpose of such legislation is to allow ownership4 0
31. Prior cases are Ex parte Trustees of Greenville Academies, 7 Rich
Eq. 471 (S. C. 1854) ; MeMannaway v. Clapp, 150 S. C. 249, 148 S. E. 18
(1929); Furman University v. Glover, 226 S. C. 1, 83 S. E. 2d 559 (1954).
32. 239 S. C. 58, 121 S. E. 2d 294 (1961).
33. 239 S. C. 478, 123 S. E. 2d 870 (1962).
34. Clanton's Auto Auction Sales, Inc. v. Harvin, 238 S. C. 352, 120
S. E. 2d 237 (1961) ; Ex Parte Dart, 238 S. C. 506, 121 S. E. 2d 1 (1961) ;
Clanton's Auto Auction Sales, Inc. v. Young, 239 S. C. 250; 122 S. E. 2d
640 (1961).
35. 50 Stat. 594 (1957), as amended 51 Stat. 1730 (1960).
36. 52 Stat. 2158 (1962) amending CODE or LAws OF SouTH CAROLINA
§ 57-308 (1952).
37. 52 Stat. 1866, approved March 16, 1962.
38. A Condominium bibliography compiled in September 1962 by Ernest
Henry Breuer, State Law Library, New York State Library, describes
Puerto Rico as ". . . the leader in the use of Condominium."

39. The Breuer Bibliography, note 38, supra, while noting that the
listing may be incomplete, states that Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, South Carolina and Virginia have Condominium Statutes, and that
such legislation has been proposed in the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma and Oregon.
40. Section 6 of the South Carolina Act, note 37, supra, provides: "Any
apartment may be held and owned by more than one person as joint
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of individual apartments in a building just as if each were
entirely independent of the other apartments, together with
a shared ownership of such general common elements as the
land, foundations, main walls, stairways, halls, elevators,
roofs, etc. Since 1961, the purchaser of a fee interest or a
long-term leasehold interest in one of these apartments can
qualify for a federally insured loan, 41 and existence of this
loan provision has furthered enactment of Condominium legis42
lation.
As the property section of the annual survey of South
Carolina law is not appropriate for a detailed study of Condominium legislation, an analysis of the South Carolina Act
must be made in some later article.
Renunciation of Dower
Last year the Legislature enacted a statute4 3 which struck

out the general section 44 dealing with renunciation of dower
and substituted therefor a short section intended, as indicated

by the act's title, "to simplify the provisions relatfng to
renunication of dower."

Prior to amendment of the section

there was an express provision that renunciations taken by
a notary public within the State were valid despite the failure
of the notary to, affix his official seal to the certificate of
renunciation, and omission of the seal was common practice.-

However, the substituted section, 45 without making an exceptenants, as tenants in common, as tenants by the entirety or in any other
real estate tenancy relationship recognized under the law of this State."
(italics added)
The provision for the ownership of an apartment by tenants by the
entirety would appear to be inadvertent, as it has been held that such
tenancy as a common law estate no longer exists in South Carolina.
Davis v. Davis 223 S.C. 182; 75 S.E. 2d 46 (1953). It is unlikely that
the Legislature intended by indirection to make a statutory re"rati'n
of the estate solely in the area of Condominium apartments. Also, the
provision for ownership of an apartment by joint tenants must be read in
the light of Code Section 19-55.
Probably the inclusion of both provisions was unintentional, and explained by the Act's importation from another state. Cf. Code § 52-12 (2)
of the Uniform Partnership Act, which similarly makes mention of joint
tenancy and tenancy by the entirety. See comment thereon in KARESH,
PartnershipLaw and the Uniform PartnershipAct in South Carolina, 3
S.C.L.Q. 231, note 126 (1951). It will be noted that tl, Davis Case, supra,
is subsequent to the enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act.
41. National Housing Act, § 234, added by 75 Stat. 160, 12 U.S.C.A. §
1715y (Supp. 1961).
42. See, for example, Section 1 of the South Carolina Act, note 37 supra.
48. 52 Stat. 416, approved May 4, 1961.
44. CODE or LAws OF SouTH CAROLINA § 19-111 (1952).
45. Supra, note 43.
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tion in the case of rennciations taken within the State,
provided in part: "The officer shall append to the writing
his certificate in the form prescribed by Section 19-114 [which
details the form of the renunciation], and affix his official
seal,4t 6 if any." In view of the mandatory.form of the quoted
language, it may be that renunciations taken within the State
during the effective period of the substituted statate 7' were
48
defective unless the notary's official seal was affixed.
This year the Legislature acted49 to remove the requirement of a notarial seal by amending the statute to read as
follows:
Section 19-111. Any woman who has an inchoate right
of dower in any lands in this State, whether she be
of lawful age or minor, may renounce and relinquish
her right of dower by acknowledging it in writing before any officer of this State, or of the state in which the
renunciation is executed, or of the United States, who
is authorized by law to administer oaths. The officer
shall append to the writing his certificate in the form
prescribed by Section 19-114. No renunciation of the
right of dower, heretofore or hereafter made, shall be
held invalid because of the absence of the official seal of
the person administering the oath.
When recorded in the county where the real estate is
located, the renunciation shall be effective to convey

%

away, bar and terminate the dower right of the woman,

46. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 49-6 (1952) provides: "Each
notary public shall have a seal of office, which shall be affixed to his
instruments of publication and to his protestations. But the absence of
such seal shall not render his acts invalid if his official title be affixed
thereto." Should the question be litigated, it, of course, is possible that the
Court may construe § 49-6 in pari materia with 52 Stat. 416 (1961). See
Bratton v. Burris, 51 S. C. 45, 50, 28 S. E. 13 (1897). Cf. First Presbyterian Church of York v. York Depository, 203 S. C. 410, 422, 27 S. E. 2d
578 (1943). If this is done, renunciations not under the official seal of
the notary taken since May 4, 1961, are valid because of the second sentence of § 49-6, supra.
147. The substituted statute (52 Stat. 416) was approved May 4, 1961,
and continued in effect until Febraury 9, 1962, the date of approval of the
1962 amendment, note 49, infra.
48. See Bratton v. Burris, note 46, supra, wherein the Court, construing
an earlier text of the dower renunciation statute, held that omission of the
notary's seal was a fatal defect, and'that the invalid certificate did not
estop the wife from obtaining dower. See also 39 Am. JUR., Notary Public
§§ 34, 35 (1942). But"see the second sentence of CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
,CAROLiNA § 49-6 (1952) set out in note 46, supra.
49. 52 Stat. 1689, approved, February 9, 1902, amending CODE OF LAWS
OP SOUTH CAROLINA, § 19-111 '(1952), as amended:52 Stat, 416 (1961).
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although she has executed no deed of conveyance for
that purpose.
It will be noted that the 1962 amendment in part provides
that "No renunciation of the right of dower, heretofore or
hereafter made, shall be held invalid because of the absence
of the official seal of the person administering the oath."
Insofar as the amendment undertakes to validate renunciations taken prior to its enactment,5 o it seems that it may
operate retrospectively to cure a defect (assuming that such
exists) arising because of omission of the notary's seal after
May 4, 1961 and before passage of the 1962 amendment,
provided that the grantor is alive on the effective date of the
amendment (Febuary 9, 1962).51 However, in the event that
the grantor did not survive until enactment of the 1962
amendment, since the dower interest of the wife would have
become consumate rather than inchoate, it is doubtful that
the amendment could operate to defeat her vested interest.5 2
One further provision of the 1962 amendment is worthy
of comment. Prior to the amendments of 1961 and 1962, the
dower renunciation statute 3 had required, as to renunciations taken without the State, either the affixation of the
notary's seal or an attestation of his official character by a
clerk of a court of record in the county in which the notary
resided. However, the amendment of 1962, without imposing any requirements of attestation of a foreign notary's
official character, has removed the requirement of affixation
of his official seal. That this was the legislative intent may
be doubted, and still further amendment of the dower renunciation statute is not unlikely.
50. The amendment of 1922 (32 Stat. 936) in part undertook to validate
dower renunciations not under official seal of the notary taken within the
State before the amendment. [This provision of the amendment is one of
several provisions now embodied in CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §
19-116 (1952).] No case considering the amendment has been found.
51. See Note, 20 A.L.R. 1330 (1922); 17A Am. JuR., Dower § 9 (1957).
52. See Note, 20 A.L.R. 1330, 1333 (1922); 17A Am. JuR., Dower § 10
(1957).
58. CODE OF LAwS oF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-111 (1952). Section 1899 of
The Revised Statutes of 1893 had expressly required as to renunciations
taken without the State, both the affixation of the notary's seal and a
certificate attesting his official character. However, the amendment of
1909 (26 Stat. 40) removed the requirement of attestation of the notary's
official character. Thereafter, the amendment of 1918 (30 Stat. 807) provided that if the notary failed to affix his official seal attestation of his
official character was essential. By the amendment of 1922 (32 Stat.
936) it was expressly provided that renunciations taken by notaries within
the State were exempted both from the requirement of affixation of the
official seal and the requirement of attestation of official character.
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